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In the run up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections in June 2026, external actors have begun using hybrid warfare tools targeting the Armenian-speaking audience—methods that have previously been widely applied in other post-Soviet countries and in the European Union.
The Fact Investigation Platform was the first to uncover and explain to the Armenian audience the nature of these hybrid warfare techniques being used against Armenia, as well as their links to Russian, Turkish, and Azerbaijani sources.
Doppelgänger: Scandalous articles on clone websites
In 2025, for the first time, the Armenian-speaking audience was targeted using the Doppelgänger hybrid warfare tool.
It all began when the reputable Armenian media outlet Mediamax mistakenly republished an article about the alleged transfer of France’s nuclear waste to Dilijan from a website called Courrier France 24. Later, however, the outlet realized that it had not republished content from the well-known France 24, but from an unknown website that closely imitates France 24.
The Fact Investigation Platform revealed that the Doppelgänger method was used—one of the most common forms of disinformation campaigns in recent years, capable of misleading even media-literate readers and professionals. Literally, the term Doppelgänger means a double or replica of a real person, but in a digital and informational context it refers to a fake or clone website or domain.
How this method works
First, the goal is to mislead the reader. A fake website is created the domain name or title of which closely resembles that of a real media outlet—for example, BBC News, but actually being bcb-news.com, or, as in the above-mentioned case, France 24, but actually courrierfrance24.com. The same or very similar logos, design, and language are then used so that the difference remains unnoticed by the reader.
Subsequently, these websites naturally spread false information and very often become active during major political and public events, such as elections, wars, or other environmentally or politically sensitive topics. Once their “mission” is accomplished, they disappear from the digital space.
FIP.am has also explained, through one of its videos, how and when this method was first used.
The Armenian audience continued to be targeted with various scandalous articles by other newly created clone websites as well, which the Fact Investigation Platform has covered in detail. These included fake articles claiming that the Prime Minister’s family had purchased multi-million-dollar luxury mansions in Marseille and Canada, allegations that millions of dollars were embezzled by the Prime Minister’s wife, among other similar fabrications.
AI, “Genocide denial and Turkification,” “election rigging and repression”
Artificial intelligence has become one of the main tools used to target the Armenian audience with disinformation campaigns. The Fact Investigation Platform almost on a daily basis exposes AI-generated videos that present false and unsupported allegations against Armenia’s current authorities.
One such example was a video circulating on social media in which a young woman, speaking broken Armenian, accused Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of child molestation. In another video circulated by Azerbaijani sources, a young woman allegedly representing Armenia’s National Security Service claimed that security forces had abused her for participating in an opposition gathering.
At the same time, dozens of other generated videos accused the Armenian authorities of planning to rig the upcoming parliamentary elections and repressing the opposition, preparing physical retaliation, and denying the Armenian Genocide.
It is noteworthy that Armenian-language social media pages and users themselves are also part of generating and spreading AI-based fake news. They regularly create videos or images depicting Pashinyan speaking Turkish, dismantling the Armenian Genocide Memorial, giving orders to security forces to carry out repression, printing hundreds of thousands of fake Armenian passports in Turkey to rig elections, or making unrealistic decisions, such as instructing taxi services in Armenia to operate exclusively with electric vehicles.
“Matryoshka” and Storm-1516: networks spreading disinformation against Armenia
Over the past year, the Fact Investigation Platform also revealed that Armenia was targeted for the first time by Kremlin-aligned networks known as “Matryoshka” and Storm-1516 conducting disinformation campaigns across post-Soviet countries.
In particular, starting June 12, it was the bots of the Matryoshka network that launched a campaign against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, using harsh criticism and false claims. Similar campaigns were later carried out by these networks as well, both through AI-generated content and through articles published on clone (imitation) websites.
A bot (from the English word robot) is a program that automatically performs certain actions instead of a human or in a human-like manner. In this context, it refers to bots widely used on social media to spread disinformation by automatically sharing content.
How these networks operate
The Russian “Matryoshka” and Storm-1516 networks, which organize and carry out disinformation campaigns, are among the largest and most sophisticated propaganda networks coordinated by the Kremlin.
These campaigns are aimed at undermining and discrediting trust in the West, as well as in pro-Western governments in post-Soviet space. They mainly operate in social media (X, TikTok, etc.), using bots to share videos and articles under disguise of real media outlets (such as Deutsche Welle, E! News, USA Today, and others).
When producing videos, they use AI-based deepfake technologies, along with fake headlines and fabricated content.
Russian foundations and generators of false narratives
In 2025, narratives targeting the Armenian audience were actively generated and disseminated by websites funded by foundations closely affiliated with the Kremlin and by so-called journalists.
Thus, the Foundation to Battle Injustice, which has ties to the Russian private military company Wagner (founder: Yevgeny Prigozhin – ed.), has published numerous fabricated pieces of information about senior Armenian officials. Such websites include London Times, VT Foreign Policy/Veterans Today, and others.
Without any facts or evidence, they have published so-called investigations alleging, among others, “illegal drug trials” in Armenia, “patronage of pedophilia” by the Speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia, “secret concentration camps” allegedly created by Pashinyan for opposition figures, and “EU-backed drug trafficking in Armenia” allegedly involving MP and businessman Khachatur Sukiasyan, etc.
One of the widely circulated false claims in Armenia was generated by Andrei Areshev, the founder of the Russian Strategic Culture Foundation (Фонд Стратегической Культуры/ SCF) in operation since 2005. Once again without presenting any concrete evidence, he claimed in June of this year that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was nationalizing the Electric Networks of Armenia in order to “sell them to a Turkish company.”
Kremlin-aligned “journalists”
The key actors of disinformation campaigns against Armenia include non-Russian “journalists” who are closely affiliated with Russian circles and engaged in pro-Kremlin propaganda.
In 2025, the Fact Investigation Platform exposed many such “journalists.” One of them is Okay Deprem, a journalist for the Turkish “yellow press” outlet ODA TV, who was nationalized after living in Luhansk for many years.
The Turkish journalist has authored numerous fake stories about Armenia, such as “Pashinyan’s undertaking to build 10 mosques in Armenia,” “ceding Syunik to Azerbaijan and territories from Armavir Province to Turkey,” “Anna Hakobyan’s expensive vacation in Antalya,” and others.
Another Kremlin-backed “journalist” is Josué Cárdenas of the Spanish outlet Periodista Digital, who is known as a “defender” and propagandist of Putin, as well as the Brazilian Lucas Leiroz, who conducts “investigations” for VT Foreign Policy.
Armenian Telegram channels and Russian intelligence agencies
Another important link in the dissemination of propaganda narratives against Armenia is coordinated Armenian Telegram channels, which particularly target Armenia’s foreign policy aimed at diversification and especially cooperation with the West.
The Fact Investigation Platform has studied and summarized several dozen such channels. In particular, they have systematically targeted Armenia’s cooperation with the West in the energy sector, within the framework of building a new modular nuclear power plant.
This was also the case recently, when the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, became a target of pro-Russian Telegram channels.
These Telegram channels also target reforms in the Armed Forces of Armenia; in particular, they criticize the waiver of Soviet standards in the selection of new uniforms and the adoption of Western standards in the Armenian Armed Forces.
It should also be noted that the import of Kazakh wheat into Armenia via Azerbaijan for the first time also became a subject of criticism; however, this time the source of conspiracy theory was the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, which, referring to information at its disposal, claimed that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was both “surprised” and “delighted”at the same time as “Yerevan has decided to stop buying grain from Russia.”
Thus, in 2025, Russia raised its propaganda pressure on Armenia to a whole new level.
Nane Manasyan
